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FEAR OF CANCER
S. Lochlann Jain*
While the cancer rate and related statistics remain remarkably high,
people rarely consider the actual suffering of people living with and
dying from cancer as the real sacrifice for, and structural result of the
everyday use of carcinogens such as those in gasoline, pesticides, and
cosmetics. On the heels of the recently published President's Cancer
Panel Report, "Reducing Environmental Cancer Risk: What We Can
Do Now," this Article aims to better understand why 'fear of cancer"
litigation has failed to accomplish its intended purpose-to distribute
the costs of known and potentially toxic chemicals-and examines how
the relevant law justifies this failure from a legal standpoint. Because of
cancer's long incubation period and the lack of knowledge about most
chemicals in fear-of-cancer cases, plaintiffs must divert their claims for
injuries resulting from toxic exposure toward the injury of 'fear" of
getting cancer as a result of such exposure. Through a review and
analysis of the President's Cancer Panel Report and some of the main
fear-of-cancer cases and literature, this Article suggests other ways of
thinking about how the law might more effectively understand and
represent toxic-exposure issues.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a lot to fear with cancer: the causes are everywhere and
nowhere, the treatments are horrific and largely inefficacious, and
the statistics about recurrence and spread are as mysterious as
knowing whose heads will surface in the icy sea when a ship meets
an iceberg. Almost half of us will go through cancer treatment of
* S. Lochlann Jain (Ph.D., University of California, Santa Cruz; B.A., McGill University),
Associate Professor at Stanford's Anthropology department, teaches medical and legal
anthropology. Her research is devoted to understanding how the inevitable injuries of mass
productions and consumption are distributed and justified in the United States. Jain's first book,
Injury (Princeton University Press, 2006), analyzed the politics of tort law by examining how
injuries and design are framed as legible legal concerns. Jain is the recipient of the Cultural
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some kind,' likely with toxic and horrible treatments such as
chemotherapy and radiation. More than 20 percent of us will die of
the disease. 2 Much as we would like to think of cancer as a disease of
the elderly (everyone has to die of something), 70,000 adults under
forty years old are diagnosed with it each year.'
Yet despite rising rates of cancer incidence, the American
population has demonstrated a remarkable capacity to hold two
utterly distinct mindsets regarding it at the same time. On the one
hand, many Americans realize that carcinogens, such as those in
gasoline, pesticides, and cosmetics, remain in everyday use. On the
other hand, people rarely consider the actual suffering of people
living with and dying from cancer as the real sacrifice to, and
structural result of, the use of these toxins.'
Some of this disjuncture results from simple diversion. Active
campaigns, such as those of the cosmetics industry, focus public
attention away from the reality that cancer results from chemical
exposures, such as exposure to cosmetic products themselves.'
Moreover, these campaigns actively suggest that cancer should be
prevented through early detection; or that curing it is an issue of
scientific progress and fundraising; or that avoiding selective
products proven to be dangerous, such as alcohol and tobacco, is the
best way to prevent the disease.6
Another cultural thread aiming public attention away from the
structural causes of cancer is the push toward thinking of
survivorship as a personal accomplishment. The campaigns that
propagate the notion are led by diverse interests, such as hospital
advertisements urging cancer patients that a particular hospital might
1. SUZANNE H. REUBEN, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PRESIDENT'S CANCER
PANEL 2008-2009 REPORT ON REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER RISK: WHAT WE CAN Do
Now 1 (2010), available at http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory/pcp/annualreports/pcp08-09rpt/
PCPReport_08-09_508.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Stats & Facts, I'M Too YOUNG FOR THIS! CANCER FOUND., http://stupidcancer.com/
about/stats.shtml (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
4. See REUBEN, supra note 1, at 51-61 (discussing the various types of carcinogens and
toxins that the public is exposed to everyday).
5. See id at 39 (mentioning the connection between cosmetic products and endocrine-
disrupting chemicals).
6. See AVON WALK FOR BREAST CANCER, http://www.avonwalk.org (last visited Sept. 17,
2010); see also Guidelines for the Early Detection of Cancer, AM. CANCER SOC'Y,
http://www.cancer.org/Healthy/FindCancerEarly/CancerScreeningGuidelines/american-cancer-
society-guidelines-for-the-early-detection-of-cancer (last updated July 6, 2010).
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make a life-or-death difference in their treatment' and Lance
Armstrong's organization LiveStrong.t Similarly damaging to public
awareness is physicians' failure to have taken an active role in
advocacy either against known carcinogens or for environmental
health.' In short, the most powerful culture-makers-including
industry, government, and medical associations-disavow the
connections between environmental toxins and the actual disease, as
well as the suffering they both cause.
For that reason, the recently published President's Cancer Panel
Report provides a welcome relief. The Panel thoroughly examined
the use of industrial, military, and agricultural carcinogens and
showed in detail the depth of society's cultural disavowal and
ignorance of the causes of cancer. " If acted upon, the Panel's
conclusions may bring the real costs of society's continued ignorance
and failure to reduce risks into the broader debate, in the same way
that Luther Terry's Surgeon General Report of 1964 did when it
finally admitted and publicized the long-demonstrated causal link
between cigarette smoking and lung cancer and took a stand on
tobacco as a matter of public health. 12
The Cancer Panel Report provides an opportunity to revisit the
ways that courts have understood and dealt with carcinogenic
exposure cases-particularly those that deal with "fear of cancer." 13
7. See U.S. News Best Hospitals 2010-2011: Cancer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
http://health.usnews.com/best-hospitals/rankings/cancer (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
8. LIVESTRONG, http://www.livestrong.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2010).
9. See REUBEN, supra note 1, at 68 (discussing the suggestion that some physicians have
financial incentives to give more CT scans than necessary, resulting in increased cancer
exposure).
10. Id. at 1.
11. Id.
12. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964),
available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/NN/B/B/M/Q/_/nnbbmq.pdf.
13. Medical malpractice laws have offered one way to negotiate the costs of cancer injuries.
Regardless of one's position on the efficacy of these laws in drawing attention to the problem of
misdiagnosis, their ability to adequately adjudicate the distribution of cancer costs has been
challenged by caps on damage awards, the high expenses of medical experts, and disagreements
in the medical community resulting from uncertainties about the disease and prognoses.
Furthermore, insurance companies have encouraged a defensive posture among oncologists that
has cultivated a culture of fear of litigation, rather than an acknowledgement of the awful costs of
widespread misdiagnosis. Thus, debate has centered around the micro-issue of the fairness of
these laws, rather than the broader questions of the causes of cancer. In the broader scheme of
cancer production, medical malpractice law can only ever address the micropolitics of cancer
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These cases hold the potential to draw attention to the major issue of
carcinogenic exposure and its widespread harm. 14 In this short
Article, I aim to better understand why fear of cancer litigation has
failed to accomplish its intended purpose, to distribute the costs of
known and potentially toxic chemicals, and how the relevant law
justifies this failure from a legal standpoint.
Cancer provides unique legal challenges to law because of the
uncertain nature of the disease. Issues such as what causes it, how it
spreads, how it should be treated, when it is worth treating, and when
and how treatment works remain medical mysteries. Law, with its
focus on adjudicating fault and distributing costs, provides a
fascinating perspective on scientific uncertainties, how such
uncertainties are regarded, and how they sometimes gain solidity
beyond their scientific meanings.
To give an example from another part of my cancer study of
how this can happen, consider the issue of lost chance-an area of
medical malpractice law dealing with missed cancer diagnoses. In
some states, a plaintiff can argue that a patient missed the chance of a
longer life because a doctor failed to diagnose a cancer at an earlier
point in its development. " Because no one can know how long an
individual patient will live after diagnosis, proving life expectancy in
such cases heavily relies on statistical data gathered from populations
suffering from seemingly comparable cancers. 16 Such statistics offer
the courts a seemingly solid basis on which to make judgments about
when missed diagnoses should count as compensable injuries. Yet
such statistics can only form the most basic guide in considering the
life and death of any given patient, except in the most extreme and
dire situations. "
While physicians have developed means to take such
uncertainties into account when treating individual patients (or at
diagnosis and whether a month or a year might have made a difference in any one individual's
life.
14. See generally Michael D. Hultquist, Fear of Cancer as a Compensable Cause ofAction,
BRIEF, Spring 2001, at 8 (listing "fear of cancer" cases arising in multiple jurisdictions where the
plaintiffs were exposed to carcinogens).
15. Sarah Lochlann Jain, Living in Prognosis: Toward an Elegiac Politics, 98
REPRESENTATIONS 77, 86-88 (2007).
16. See id. at 86 (explaining that oncology delivers prognoses and statistics as they appear in
populations of individuals whose medical histories are more or less similar to the patient's).
17. See id. at 87.
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least means of explaining these uncertainties to patients), courts must
figure out how to account for uncertainties when applying population
data to individual cases. Courts have typically done this by running
such data through their own legal tests, such as the "more likely than
not" test. 18 But reliance on such data is necessarily misleading
regardless of the legal test applied, for it is impossible to directly
relate a population-based statistic to any particular individual who
will either die or not die of that disease. Such attempts to use these
statistics with little thought as to the broader implications of their use
may even undermine the courts' ability to protect Americans from an
increasingly toxic environment.
Ironically, because of cancer's long incubation period and the
lack of knowledge about most chemicals in fear-of-cancer cases,
plaintiffs must divert their claims for injuries resulting from toxic
exposure toward the injury of "fear" of getting cancer as a result of
such exposure. Commentators, however, fret that fear can be
"trivial," "easy to feign," and "short-lived." " Cancer itself is none of
those things, but the very fact that dangerous exposure to
carcinogens can only be compensated through a claim of fear belies
American legal anxieties and management strategies. It forces the
establishment of tests, certainties, and rules where such positivist
fantasies only add to, rather than resolve, the problem of cancer.
Under a fear analysis, the problem of exposure to carcinogens
can too easily be reduced to questions of perception: to problems
about fear and about how individuals understand risk. Such red-
herring questions veer society's attention away from the actual
practical concern, which is to figure out who is responsible for the
health effects of common chemicals-some toxic and most untested.
Such questions pose a challenge to the legal system. Courts must
develop strategies to address the unknown health consequences of
mass exposure to everyday chemicals, as well as the individual
injuries and unknown consequences suffered by particular plaintiffs
as a result of exposure.
In this Article, I will first offer a short review and analysis of the
latest President's Cancer Panel Report "Reducing Environmental
18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26
cmt. n (2010).
19. Keith J. Klein, Fear of Cancer-A Legitimate Claim in Toxic Tort Cases?, 33 A.F. L.
REv. 193, 198 (1990).
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Cancer Risk: What We Can Do Now" ("the Report"). 20 This
document offers a thorough review of the challenges facing the
widespread and increasing problem of environmentally caused
cancers. I then review some of the main "fear of cancer" cases and
literature, and conclude with some suggestions for other ways of
thinking about how the law might more effectively understand and
represent toxic exposure issues.
II. CANCER CAUSATION
The recently published report urges the President "most strongly
to use the power of your office to remove the carcinogens and other
toxins from our food, water, and air that needlessly increase health
care costs, cripple our Nation's productivity, and devastate American
lives."2 1
The report examines in detail the gross underestimation of the
true burden of environmentally caused cancers, noting that of the
80,000 chemicals on the U.S. market and in daily use, only a few
hundred have been studied for carcinogenicity. 2
The report indicates several key issues that have resulted in the
high rates of and mortality from cancer in the United States-rates
that remain higher than those of other industrialized nations. The
primary challenges faced by Americans are the limited research on
the environmental causes of cancer, the underfunding and scattered
nature of such research, the reliance on animal studies, the lack of
data on low-dose exposures and combinations of exposures,
ineffective regulations, the medical radiation exposures that
physicians often underestimate, and the military hazardous exposures
that have been concealed by the military.23
The report further suggests that medical cancer research focuses
primarily on the genetic causes of cancer, while less than 5 percent
of cancer diagnoses can be linked to inherited genetic traits.24
Physicians rarely ask about exposures in patient interviews, even
20. REUBEN, supra note 1.
21. Id. at Dear Mr. President.
22. Id. at ii.
23. Id. at i-vi.
24. Id. at 1.
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though cancer rates for certain types of cancer can be correlated to
occupational exposures. 25
Unlike the process for enacting regulations in Europe, in the
United States "a hazard must be incontrovertibly demonstrated
before action to ameliorate it is initiated." 26 In other words, while
European governments regulate chemicals based on initial evidence
of toxicity, the U.S. government will allow likely, potential, and
actual carcinogens to be produced and used for many years while
adequate "proof' of danger is being gathered and debated.
Thus, ironically, eighty million pounds of atrazine, a chemical
manufactured by the European company Syngenta, is poured onto
U.S. soil each year, while the chemical is illegal in many parts of
Europe because of its toxicity. 27 This and similar chemicals do not
leave the environment quickly. 2 8 For example, dichlorodiphenyl-
trichloroethane (DDT), banned in 1973, is still ubiquitous in
American bodies, foods, and environments.2 9 A recent study of
randomly sampled foods found DDT metabolites in 60 percent of
heavy cream samples and 28 percent of carrots.30 Similarly,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), slow-degrading carcinogens
banned in the late 1970s, are still found in human flesh, soil, water
sources, and walls of buildings. 3
The Report lists several known carcinogenic chemicals in
common use that are legal and require no labeling or warnings, such
as cadmium, phthalates, asbestos, chromium, diesel fuel, mercury,
formaldehyde.3 2 Similarly, bisphenol A (BPA) is found at
biologically active levels in 93 percent of Americans, and 130
studies have linked BPA to breast cancer, heart disease, and liver
abnormalities.33 It is still legal and commonly used in food
25. Id. at ix.
26. Id at ii.
27. Id at 46.
28. See Frank Ackerman, The Economics of Atrazine, 13 INT'L J. OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL.
HEALTH 441, 441 (2007).
29. REUBEN, supra note 1, at 46.
30. Id. at 47.
31. Id at 30.
32. Id at 22-23.
33. Id. at 18.
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packaging and children's chewable toys and bottles, and it requires
no labeling or warning.3 4
Americans are often ignorant of known carcinogens, even when
the carcinogens have garnered press. But industries, such as
cosmetics, paint, and plastics, have also consistently lobbied to
disallow ingredient lists on products, or even, as in the recent
California Safe Cosmetics Act,3 5 to disclose the carcinogens used in
its proprietary ingredients. 6
The report continues for nearly 150 pages, detailing the hazards
of living and dying in America and the ways and reasons that the
risks continue to be underestimated, unknown, and covered up. But
two points emerge as critical for thinking about toxic exposure cases.
First, we simply do not have ways to understand toxic body
burdens. Studies have shown that virtually all Americans carry and
are now born with body burdens of known toxic chemicals. 3
However, ten years after the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was mandated to develop a program to identify human
exposures to endocrine disruptors, it has yet to develop screening
tests. "
Second, U.S. regulatory agencies tacitly permit the use of toxic
chemicals if their benefits outweigh the risks they pose.3 9
Approximately forty chemicals classified as known, probable, or
possible human carcinogens are used in EPA-registered pesticides,
and many more pesticide ingredients are not tested. Such
carcinogens end up in the water, in the soil, and on food. For
example, over 75 percent of food in American grocery stores has
residues of one or more pesticide chemicals.41
The EPA allows chemicals that do not pose an "unreasonable
risk to man or the environment, taking into account the economic,
social, and environmental costs and benefits of the use of any
34. Id.
35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111791 (West 2006).
36. Ann G. Grimaldi, California Goes Green(er) Through New Chemical Initiative, LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 14, 2009, at 1.
37. Body Burden-The Pollution in Newborns, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP, (July 14, 2005),
http://www.ewg.org/reports/bodyburden2/execsumm.php; see also REUBEN, supra note 1, at 5.
38. REUBEN, supra note 1, at 38.
39. Id. at 45.
40. Id.
41. See id at 46.
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pesticide." 42 Such risks, costs, and benefits are unequally distributed
among and borne by members of the public depending on factors
such as occupation, gender, age, and geographic location.43
Historically, the role of tort law has precisely been to ensure that
all costs-including the costs of injury-are visible and taken into
account. The role of law is to protect citizens from the dangers of
products that are beyond their ken.
But literature on fear of cancer does not address the multiple
uncertainties of science and politics that are specific to cancer,
despite-or perhaps because of-its potential to change the patterns
of human exposure to carcinogens in the United States.
III. FEAR-OF-CANCER CLAIMS
Tort law developed in the twentieth century as a means to
protect consumers and bystanders from the inevitable injuries of
capitalism.4 5 Throughout that century, tort law placed responsibility
on the design and manufacturing processes as a way to protect
consumers from predictable injuries and, where such injuries were
impossible to avoid, to spread their costs. 46 Thus, the development of
product liability law can be read as a contest between manufacturers'
arguments-that people should be responsible for the products they
use-and plaintiffs' claims-that manufacturers should take into
consideration the probable and possible injuries that result from use
of their products.
Tort law has both reflected and made policy, albeit in a
piecemeal way, that has dramatically affected American injury
patterns and quality of life. Also, it has tended to follow broader
political shifts. For example, in the early 1960s, automobile drivers
bore the full responsibility of crash injuries; then, after a decade of
safety activism, courts decided that manufacturers were uniquely
positioned to understand predictable crash injuries and to develop at
least minimally crashworthy designs. Similarly, tobacco consumers
42. Id at 45.
43. Id. at 25-26.
44. 74 AM. JUR. 2D Torts § 8 (2010).
45. MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 31 (8th ed. 2001).
46. See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 57 (2001).
47. See United States v. Ford Motor Co., 574 F.2d 534, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that
Congress desired to "protect the public against the unreasonable risk of accidents which might be
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were responsible for tobacco-related injuries, despite ample evidence
of deceit in advertising, causal links between smoking and lung
cancer, and nicotine's addictive nature.4 8 In both of these cases, the
policy changes were not based on new science, but on different
political views of how the science should be understood.
Emotional harm has been taken seriously as an injury itself, in
some cases as a corollary to physical injury and in others-such as in
loss of consortium cases-as an injury itself.4' Fear-of-cancer cases,
which are typically brought after an exposure to a carcinogen, fall
into the category of emotional harm. Courts have further sub-divided
these cases into sub-categories of "cancerphobia" and "fear of
cancer." 5o
A cancerphobia plaintiff case needs to prove that a medical
phobia resulted from an exposure to a carcinogen and has become its
own psychological injury, aside from any physical injury that the
exposure has or will cause. " On the other hand, fear of cancer cases
typically arise after a plaintiff has been exposed to a carcinogen and
is afraid of developing cancer. 52 In a case where it is more likely than
not that cancer develop as a result of the exposure, a plaintiff
typically must prove varying degrees of risk and current physical
injury, depending on the jurisdiction.53
Courts have varied widely on the requisite level of actual risk of
cancer and the standard of proof for the physical likelihood and
evidence of potential cancer (such as pre-cancerous lesions or pleural
thickening). 5" Many courts worry that emotional injury is easy to
caused by defects in the design, construction, or performance of motor vehicles and against the
unreasonable risk of death or injury in the event of such accidents").
48. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, supra note 12, at 30.
49. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock, Etc. § 2 (2010).
50. Hultquist, supra note 14, at 9 (discussing the difference between "cancer-phobia" and
"fear of cancer" cases).
51. Id. (explaining that cancer-phobia is a defined medical condition that is "used to describe
a phobic reaction or apprehension that was experienced by the plaintiff, due to her fear of
contracting cancer in the future").
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 811 (Cal. 1993).
54. Compare Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232, 238 (Pa. 1996) (adopting the view that
damages for fear of cancer are speculative and requiring the fear of cancer to be the result of
present physical injury to be compensable), with Edward M. Slaughter, AIDS Phobia: The
Infliction of Emotional Distress and the Fear of AIDS, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 143, 155 (1994)
(presenting cases where no present physical injury was required: Gideon v. John-Mansfield Sales
Corp.-plaintiff allowed recovery for fear of future cancer as a result of inhaling asbestos fibers
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feign or is trivial," but generally all courts agree that the fear of
cancer must be both reasonable and causally related to the
defendant's negligence. 56
I will comment here on Potter v. Firestone, " in which the
California Supreme Court recognized a genuine fear-of-cancer claim
but gave four public policy reasons for "refusing to establish a
reasonableness standard" in allowing fear-of-cancer claims.
Firestone's negligence was never at issue," and thus this analysis
will focus on the question of how courts should allocate the potential
costs of an exposure to toxic substances.
Between 1967 and 1980, Firestone disposed of toxic chemicals
and known human carcinogens at the Crazy Horse dump in Salinas,
California.6 o Because of the dump's proximity to local residents'
drinking water sources, the dump required Firestone to abide by its
strict environmental standards. 61 However, in 1984, benzene,
toluene, chloroform, and vinyl chloride were found in local drinking
water wells, along with other suspected carcinogens. 62 About 6,200
people within three miles of the site had consumed contaminated
drinking water, and in 1987 the City of Salinas bought the houses
and bulldozed them.6
Two families sued Firestone, and Firestone internal documents
revealed that plant managers knew that the company was illegally
dumping the chemical wastes from its vulcanization processes since
while working on defendant's defective products-and Anderson v. Welding Testing Lab., Inc.-
plaintiff compensated for fear of losing fingers even though the probability of future harm was
minimal).
55. See Slaughter, supra note 54, at 146.
56. See generally Klein, supra note 19 (indicating that fear of cancer must be reasonable and
causally related to defendant's negligence). See also Jay E. Znaniecki, Note, Cancerphobia
Damages in Medical Malpractice Claims, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 639 (1997) (explaining the same
requirement).
57. 863 P.2d 795.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 804.
60. Id. at 801.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 801-02.
63. National Service Center for Environmental Publications Simple Search, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://nepis.epa.gov (last visited Sept. 29, 2010) (check "1986-1990" and search
for "Salinas"; follow "Descriptions of 187 Sites Proposed for the National Priorities List as of
February 1990"; scroll down to 13th Site).
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1977. ' Initially, the plaintiffs were awarded over $1.3 million in
compensatory and $2.6 million in punitive damages. 6' However, the
California Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the
case on the issue of emotional distress and fear of cancer.66
The "fingerprint" of the residents' water was later found to be
identical to the various chemicals that Firestone had dumped, and
thus plaintiffs brought a fear-of-cancer suit. 67 Plaintiffs were required
to prove: (1) that their fear was a result of the defendant's negligent
breach of duty owed to the plaintiff; and (2) that they were exposed
to a toxic substance that threatens cancer.6' Furthermore, they were
to prove that the fear stemmed from knowledge, corroborated by
reliable medical or scientific opinion, that it was more likely than not
that the plaintiff would develop the cancer in the future due to the
toxic exposure.69
The court decided that despite Firestone's clear negligence,
which even the company did not dispute, plaintiffs could not show
that that they were more likely than not to develop cancer as a result
of the exposure. Such proof, were it to produce the kind of
statistical data requested by the court, would require exposing a
population to a similar panel of chemicals and comparing it over
time to a group that was unexposed to the chemicals. Such a test is
both unethical and impossible to do given the short span of human
lives and the newness of many of the chemicals.
Be that as it may, the majority opinion offers a lengthy defense
of its failure to find reasonable fear of cancer-based public policy
concerns far beyond the specific incidents of this case.
Primarily, the court gave four policy reasons to oppose fear of
cancer cases:
1. The class of potential plaintiff is potentially
unlimited. The court stated: "[A]ll of us are
potential fear of cancer plaintiffs, provided we are
sufficiently aware of and worried about the
64. Potter, 863 P.2d at 801-02.
65. Id. at 803.
66. Id. at 827.
67. Id. at 802.
68. Id. at 816.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 811.
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possibility of developing cancer from exposure to or
ingestion of a carcinogenic substance.""1
2. The development of new and advantageous drug
therapies would be inhibited if recovery for fear of
cancer were allowed for anyone who could testify to
reasonably fearing subsequently developed harmful
effects. 72
3. Court resources should be devoted to those who
actually do develop cancer. To allow damages for
fear of cancer would lead to inequitable results since
those who never contract cancer would obtain
damages even though the disease never came to
fruition. The actual compensation due to the
plaintiff can be more accurately assessed when the
disease has manifested. 3
4. To ensure consistency in verdicts, the court called
for a "definite and predictable threshold for
recovery."7 4
Obvious bad faith -pervades these rationales. For example, with
respect to reason number two, drug-testing regulation requires that
risk-benefit assessments be made in light of people's diseases, that
drugs have some possibility of offering aid, and that initial drug
testing be performed on small groups." If anything, the recent
litigation on hormone-replacement therapies demonstrates that the
opposite is true-that is, that drugs on the market have not been
adequately tested for carcinogenic effect and that we should be as
wary about drugs as we are about other industrial products. "
The third point begs itself, because the injury being claimed is
the fear of cancer, not cancer itself. Thus, the accurate assessment of
compensation must be made on the basis of fear and not on the basis
71. Id. at 812.
72. Id. at 812-13.
73. Id. at 813.
74. Id.
75. See generally Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
default.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2010) (outlining procedures and precautions taken when new
drugs are being considered for FDA approval).
76. See Menopausal Hormone Replacement Therapy and Cancer Risk, AM. CANCER SoC'Y,
http://www.cancer.org/Cancer/CancerCauses/OtherCarcinogens/MedicalTreatments/menopausal-
hormone-replacement-therapy-and-cancer-risk (last updated Sept. 29, 2010).
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of actual cancer. However, the more pertinent point is that when
cancer does develop, it is extremely difficult to causally link a
specific exposure to a resulting cancer. " Cancers can appear decades
after an initial exposure," and except in a very few cases of rare
cancers, causation is virtually impossible to prove conclusively."
Therefore, this claim about what court resources "should" be used
for seems evasive, at best.
The first and fourth claims raise the question of uncertainty and
how to approach legal decisions given the scientific uncertainty and
the impossibility of data requirements in courts for claims regarding
cancer.
In making its policy claims, the court relied heavily on an article
by Robert Willmore, a defense attorney who, according to his
website, "supervised the defense of over $100 billion in tort claims
against the federal government involving such areas as asbestos,
Agent Orange, radiation exposure, environmental and toxic torts, and
aviation disasters."so
Willmore considers fear-of-cancer cases under the rubric of
cancerphobia, claiming that such cases threaten to get out of
control. 8 In a unique spin on the personal responsibility arguments
of the tort reform movement, he states that the legitimacy of such
claims would "make it much more likely that a person exposed to
small amounts of a carcinogen will sue rather than shrug off the risk
as one more of the numerous small cancer-causing risks to which we
are all constantly exposed."82 Here, Willmore asks us to accept all
exposures as equivalent-and to shrug them off as normal, everyday
occurrences.
Furthermore, rather than demonstrating that large awards may
act as a deterrent to companies such as Firestone, which are
searching for inexpensive means of disposing of chemical hazards,
Willmore is concerned with deception by plaintiffs. 83 Willmore
77. See Potter, 863 P.2d at 811-12, 826.
78. Id. at 805.
79. See id. at 811-12.
80. Robert L. Willmore, CROWELL & MORING, http://www.crowell.com/Professionals/
Robert-Willmore (last visited Aug. 31, 2010).
81. See Robert L. Willmore, In Fear of Cancerphobia, 56 DEF. COUNS. J. 50, 50 (1989).
82. Id. at 53.
83. Id.
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claims without support that large awards are more likely to increase
the number of plaintiffs who are willing to deceive; he writes that
"[t]hey may feel, after all, that they are entitled to something for
having been exposed in the first place."8 4
Indeed, we are asked to shrug off exposures every day from
plastics, oil and gas, cosmetics, and other everyday products, as the
Report demonstrates. " If individuals and regulatory agencies did not
shrug off exposures to known carcinogens, perhaps there would be
more stringent regulations of such products-as there are in Canada
and Europe. 86
The United States has consistently refused to create standards
for negligent exposure, including standards relating to warning about
or compensating for toxic exposures. " Willmore's argument presents
a classic example of the displacement of fear that operates at the
political level. Willmore argues that "the understandable fear of a
surge of cancerphobia liability was one of the issues that led to the
ultimate defeat by filibuster in 1988 in the Senate of a Worker High-
Risk Notification Bill (S. 79)" (a bill introduced that would have
enabled exposed workers to have been informed about their
exposures). "
While the court initially used the uncertainty about whether a
cancer would arise following an exposure to refuse the fear-of-cancer
claim, now the threat of being able to collect evidence linking
exposures and disease is being used to maintain the state of
ignorance. Cancerphobia is made to sound irrational and is being
used to serve those interests that maintain a state of ignorance, when
in fact it presents a rhetorical trope.
In making its third point, the Potter court misquotes the
Willmore article. Willmore writes: "It would be a regrettable irony if
in the rush to compensate the psychically injured we make it
impossible to compensate those suffering from permanent and
serious physical injuries."89 While seeming to present a real trade-off
84. Id.
85. See REUBEN, supra note 1, at 39.
86. See, e.g., id at 22 ("[I]n 1976, the EU prohibited the use of approximately 1,100
chemicals in cosmetics."); id at 18 (noting that Canada banned the use of BPA, a known
carcinogen, in the manufacture of baby bottles).
87. REUBEN, supra note 1.
88. Willmore, supra note 81, at 54.
89. Id. at 55.
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here (of course one would want to compensate those suffering from
cancer), the statement is actually an idly speculative trade-off since it
remains virtually impossible for people exposed to toxins to prove
causation-or even to know the specificities of their exposures in
most cases (as the filibuster of bill S. 79 demonstrates).90
In fact, Willmore's prior sentence is completely speculative:
"One of the difficult questions courts adjudicating cancerphobia
claims must ask themselves is whether cancerphobia liability will
undermine the ability of the insurance industry [whatever that is] to
provide insurance arrangements for adequate compensation for
persons who actually suffer physical injuries caused by toxic
exposures." 9 1
The court's fourth policy concern worries about the "appropriate
balance between the interests of toxic exposure litigants and the
burdens on society and judicial administration."92 The court is
"satisfied that the more likely than not threshold for fear of cancer
claims in negligent actions" strikes the appropriate balance. "
Two points deserve mention here. First, such data are simply
impossible to collect given the current knowledge of chemical
carcinogens. Recall that the court denied the fear-of-cancer claim
on the basis that plaintiffs could not show that they were more likely
than not to develop cancer as a result of the exposure, and it is
impossible to tell what such data would consist of or how it would be
gathered.95
Second, the pseudoscientific language of a "more likely than not
threshold" makes this rule seem as if it makes sense. Yet closer
scrutiny reveals that in fact the court's language makes it perfectly
acceptable to allow a chemical exposure that will kill off 20, 30, 40,
or even 49 percent of a population.96 For if each person can claim
only that he or she is 49 percent likely to develop cancer, and in a
class of one hundred, forty-nine sicken and die, none will be able to
meet the more-likely-than-not threshold. Even after a cancer
90. Id at 54.
91. Id at 55.
92. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 816 (Cal. 1993).
93. Id.
94. See REUBEN, supra note 1, at ii.
95. Potter, 863 P.2d at 803.
96. See id. at 800.
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diagnosis, each individual would more likely than not not have
developed cancer.
Courts have struggled over two main problems in fear-of-cancer
claims: scientific uncertainty in causation and the potential number
of plaintiffs in light of the ubiquity of carcinogens." But the vast
numbers of people injured by chemical exposures mitigates in favor
of reducing such exposures, rather than allowing them. 98
Furthermore, courts have a real opportunity here to admit to
uncertainty, rather than pretending there is or could be certainty
where there is none or creating their own linguistic diversions.
Courts could expand the category of injury to include exposures to
carcinogens and potential carcinogens. They have the potential to
encourage, rather than discourage, the conditions for increased
scientific knowledge, monitoring, and data collection.
The fear-of-cancer claims offer a potential avenue to curb the
use of carcinogens as well as their mishandling in an immediate way.
The theory of these cases, however, suggests waiting for decades,
until cancers have developed and more people are exposed, before
doing anything.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) describes fear as: "The
emotion of pain or uneasiness caused by the sense of impending
danger, or by the prospect of some possible evil."99 The dictionary
offers a rather vague definition here; after all, "impending danger"
differs significantly from some "possible evil"-how possible? How
evil? How impending? Similarly, the modifiers "some possible" and
"sense of' add a subjective dimension to what otherwise might
indicate a wave to statistical data: is a 50 percent chance of dying of
cancer to be considered as an actual impending danger, or does it
merely give one a sense of impending danger? Such rhetorical
hedges indeed reflect the scientific language of cancer itself.
Chemotherapy treatment may increase the chance of survival by
between 3 and 5 percent over a few years. "' Such an increase is
97. See id. at 811.
98. See REUBEN, supra note 1, at 1-2.
99. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 780-81 (J.A. Simpson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989).
100. Jain, supra note 15, at 79.
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scientifically significant and is personally significant enough that
many people choose to undergo it. However, it definitely does not
"more likely than not" lead to one's survival.
Fear and statistics can combine to do important economic and
political work. Consider, for example, the recent campaign for the
HPV vaccine Gardasil. Its jingle of "one less" implied that each
young woman vaccinated with Gardasil would become one less
person who would develop cervical cancer. '0 The ad played on
parents' fears that their daughters were at risk for cervical cancer; the
ad exacerbated parents' fears that their daughters were at risk for
cervical cancer, making these fears seem reasonable, while
downplaying the risks of the vaccine itself. 102 The advertising
campaign worked, as many do, by provoking a fear and then offering
a way to eradicate it.
But fear relates to many things that have seemingly little bearing
on any actual impending danger. Many people who fear cancer will
never get it, and many people who do not fear it will get it. People
will let lumps and bumps grow huge and not even think of cancer,
while others will go to a doctor for small bumps. Many people I have
interviewed have had their cancer misdiagnosed, for months and
sometimes years, with claims that they should not worry. Bumps
may be gendered-as a gross stereotype that may be as misleading as
true, women may see doctors more than men, but also have their
complaints dismissed more blatantly. 103 Such stereotypes in
combination underlie the fact that missed breast cancer diagnoses are
among the most common medical malpractice claims. 104
The history of tobacco offers another way to understand how
manipulable anxiety has been and how people may stretch toward
disavowing or performing fear as part of other identities. After all,
how many billions of dollars has it taken to manage, erase, and hide
the anxieties caused by the increasing knowledge about the causal
links between smoking and cancer? How much did it cost to make
the risks of smoking seem hip and cool?
101. See GARDASIL, http://www.gardasil.com (displaying the "one less" advertisement) (last
visited Sept. 5, 2010).
102. Id.
103. See Jain, supra note 15, at 85-86.
104. Saul Weingart et al., Process of Care Failures in Breast Cancer Diagnosis, 24 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 702, 702-09 (2009).
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These examples show the complexity of understanding fear-
both its subjectivity and the extent to which American capitalist and
military interests manipulate it.
On a cultural level, organizations in the United Kingdom and
United States have constantly been at work in negotiating and
managing fear of cancer by developing early-detection campaigns. 105
Historians, for example, have closely traced how such management
has manifested in campaigns that ultimately have not informed the
populace about carcinogens or how to advocate and communicate in
medical situations. '06 One early study, finding that doctors were at
fault in over half of terminal cases in which early signs of the disease
were missed and discussing the necessity for early-detection
campaigns, concluded that,
Cancerphobia or hysteria must be avoided, of course, and
grewsome [sic] discussions of neglected cases are not
usually helpful. In general a calm, rational, thoughtful
statement is more effectual than hysterical or alarmist
appeals. After all, patients are quite reasonable in their
views or health and disease if only given a fair insight into
conditions. 'o
Yet the American Cancer Society has never taken a role in
educating people about the prevalence of misdiagnosis, how to
communicate with doctors, or the environmental, military, medical,
and agricultural causes of cancer. Early-detection campaigns thus
remain of questionable use.
Cancerphobia, here linked with hysteria, indicates some less
reasonable fear-or fear taken into the realm of fear in itself rather
than of some other possible future. Here again the OED is helpful,
describing a phobia as "[a] fear, horror, strong dislike, or aversion;
esp. an extreme or irrational fear or dread aroused by a particular
object or circumstance." ' No one likes or is not averse to cancer, so
cancerphobia must indicate an irrational fear.
Ultimately, a legal focus on fear, when it comes to cancer, is
bound for a dark hole of inexplicability and rhetorical manipulation.
105. See AM. CANCER Soc'Y, supra note 6.
106. See Charles E. Farr, Delay in the Treatment of Cancer, 164 AM. J. MED. SCI. 712 (1922).
107. Id. at 714.
108. 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 693 (J.A. Simpson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989).
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The logic of fear will always come down to an individuated
experience, one difficult to link to the powerful forces at play in
cancer production in America. To turn the question of toxic exposure
into one about figuring out whether an individual fear is legitimate
offers an example of the kind of bad-faith sleight of hand all too
common in American legal practice.
It is unlikely that the United States will adopt a preventative
European model of assessing chemical use. Rather, legal minds need
to set to work to figure out how to make up for the limits of science,
how to distribute the costs of unknowns, and how to make cancer-
causation a part of the cost of doing business with carcinogens. Some
of the costs of causing cancer could be rolled into the costs of doing
business if legal practitioners can figure out a way for exposures
themselves to count as injuries, especially in cases where the data
have not yet been collected.
